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Chapter 4
Why Moral Expertise Needs Moral Theory
Michael Cholbi
Philosophical and ethical literature concerning whether moral expertise exists and 
who (if anyone) might possess it has proliferated in recent years. My purpose here 
is not to address either of these questions, at least not directly. Rather, my concern 
is to investigate a matter that has been somewhat neglected in this literature, namely, 
the relationship between moral expertise and moral theory. With a few exceptions, 
debates about the nature and distribution of moral expertise have proceeded with 
relatively little attention to moral theory. No doubt part of the explanation for this 
inattention is that many of the contributors to these debates are ultimately concerned 
with whether a particular class of individuals, namely clinical bioethicists, are (or 
should be treated as) moral experts. (See among many Rasmussen 2011; Priaulx 
2013) A central theme of my discussion will be that the neglect of moral theory in 
philosophical debates about moral expertise is unfortunate inasmuch as moral 
expertise is much more entangled with moral theory than contributors to these 
debates typically acknowledge. In particular, I shall attempt to show that moral 
expertise is theory-dependent. By this, I mean, first, that moral expertise consists, at 
least in part, in knowledge of the correct or best moral theory, and second, that 
knowledge of moral theory is essential to moral experts dispensing expert counsel 
to non-experts. Roughly then, if utilitarianism is correct, then a moral expert must 
embrace utilitarianism and invoke it in support of her moral testimony; if Kantianism 
is correct, then a moral expert must embrace Kantianism and invoke it in support of 
her moral testimony; etc. Hence, moral experts would not be moral experts absent 
knowledge of moral theory, nor could they play the role we would expect them to 
play in moral inquiry and deliberation absent such knowledge.
My plan is as follows. In Section 4.1, I suggest that debates about moral expertise 
are better served not by efforts to define the notion but by attempting to identify 
those features of moral expertise that are responsible for scholarly controversies 
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about its nature and distribution. Section 4.2 proposes that there are two such fea-
tures, captured in what I call the epistemic condition and the testimonial condition 
for moral expertise. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 seek to demonstrate that neither of these 
conditions is theory-independent; that is, in order for a putative moral expert to 
satisfy these two conditions, she must possess and make use of knowledge of the 
correct or best moral theory.
There is one sense in which moral expertise might depend on moral theory that I 
do not address here. Some philosophers have thought that irrespective of whether 
there are individuals with the moral knowledge necessary to be moral experts, there 
is itself something morally questionable about our treating others as moral experts, 
perhaps because obeying the moral dictates of others would amount to foregoing or 
denying our own autonomy or agency. (Wolff 1970; see also D’Agostino 1998 and 
Driver 2006) A moral theory might, in other words, condemn moral agents’ defer-
ring to moral experts. If so, then a moral theory rules out not expertise itself but the 
practice of treating others as experts. This ‘deontic’ dependence is not the sort of 
dependence of moral expertise with which I am concerned here. My concerns are 
with whether moral expertise is theory-dependent metaphysically, in that knowl-
edge of the correct or best moral theory constitutes moral expertise, or epistemi-
cally, in that such knowledge has a part to play in the experts’ moral testimony being 
rightfully treated by others as expert testimony.
In investigating the relationships between moral expertise and moral theory, I do 
not aim to hash out the merits of rival moral theories in an effort to identify which 
of these theories is correct or most defensible. Whether the fact that a moral theory 
renders moral expertise intelligible is a mark for or against its plausibility depends 
crucially on the degree to which rendering moral expertise intelligible is an impor-
tant desideratum on moral theories generally. Sentiments vary on that matter, I 
expect. Some moral philosophers may insist that a moral theory needs to make 
sense of moral expertise, whereas others, upon discovering that a particular theory 
problematizes, or even precludes, moral expertise, would respond to this finding 
with indifference or even enthusiasm. I do not weigh in on this metaphilosophical 
dispute here. I merely hope to clarify the relationship between moral theory and 
moral expertise and leave it to others to draw out the implications my conclusions 
may have in appraising rival theories.
4.1  The Stakes of the Moral Expertise Debate
Precisely what moral expertise consists in is far from obvious. Julia Driver (2013) 
has recently suggested that debates about moral expertise come to loggerheads 
when different senses of moral expertise are conflated. She notes that moral experts 
may be expert moral judges, especially adept at arriving at correct moral judgments; 
expert moral practitioners, those who act morally well more than others might; or 
expert moral analysts, those who have greater insight into the nature of morality. 












































that expertise in a given domain may take on different guises. Compare linguistic 
expertise. Those able to speak a given language with great fluency, those with excel-
lent knowledge of that language’s grammar, and those capable of crafting compel-
ling poetry in that language can all plausibly be called experts in that language 
despite their respective aptitudes being only contingently correlated to one another.
Driver’s observations underscore that the project of defining moral expertise is 
likely to be misguided. ‘Moral expertise’ is not an everyday term from which we 
can extract different candidate definitions that can then be compared to ordinary 
usage, and it is therefore likely that any attempt to define moral expertise will strike 
partisans in debates about its nature and distribution as attempts to shape such 
debates by definitional fiat. Hence, I make no pretense of defining moral expertise 
here. Rather, I follow what I believe is a more fruitful method, namely, one that 
begins by asking why moral expertise is hotly debated in the first place and what is 
concretely at stake in such debates. What practical difference does it make if there 
are moral experts — or put differently, what must moral experts be if their existence 
makes a practical difference?
In this connection, that the question of whether bioethicists (or moral philoso-
phers) are moral experts has been so prominent in these debates is telling. 
Technologically advanced liberal democratic societies put moral expertise in a pre-
carious social position. On the one hand, such societies tend to suppose that consul-
tation with experts is essential to crafting wise decisions or policies. Respectful of 
science, such societies usually have large numbers of officials, scholars, etc., who, 
thanks to their expertise, wield disproportionate influence over public choice and 
action. At the same time though, these same societies tend to embody the Rawlsian 
picture of liberal society, with their members endorsing a diversity of reasonable 
conceptions of the good while aiming to respect value pluralism and individual 
autonomy. (D’agostino 1998; Kuczewski 2007; Kovács 2010) These two features of 
such societies generate competing demands that render moral expertise problematic 
in ways that other forms of expertise seemingly are not: The authority of experts 
should be respected, but the judgments of would-be moral experts are not and 
should not (thanks to value pluralism, autonomy, and so on) be invested with the 
same authority as the judgments of other expert authorities. This problematic is in 
evidence in debates about whether clinical ethicists are moral experts. In an institu-
tional context in which patient autonomy is given normative priority and paternal-
ism is frowned upon, what place is there for an individual whose expertise is not 
scientific or medical but ethical, and in what sense ought patients defer to these 
experts?
Debates about moral expertise, I propose, therefore acquire their practical stakes 
from worries about whether, in liberal democratic societies in particular, there ought 
to be a class of individuals acknowledged and treated as having disproportionate 
moral authority. They are thus debates are whether anyone should be understood as 
suitable for playing the social role of moral expert.
My larger concern here is what place knowledge of moral theory would need to 
have for moral experts to be suited to play this social role. But the more immediate 
point is that we need not settle every detail about the nature of moral expertise in 















































order to home in on what moral expertise would have to consist in so that there 
could be individuals who play the social role about which controversy has arisen. 
Let us now consider in greater depth the social role of experts and what features 
moral experts must have in order to account for the controversies surrounding their 
existence and distribution.
4.2  Two Features of Moral Experts
One platitude about moral expertise is that it is a species of expertise. I contend that 
the most succinct way to capture the notion of expertise is to say that experts are 
those whose testimony in their respective areas of expertise ought to be trusted. That 
expertise involves experts being trusted illustrates that expertise gains conceptual 
traction in those areas of human endeavor in which the knowledge relevant to that 
endeavor is not equally distributed, and as a consequence, some individuals must 
defer to the judgments of others if the latter are to make correct choices within that 
endeavor. While a scientific layperson ought to trust the testimony of a quantum 
physicist regarding how subatomic particles behave, two expert quantum physicists 
typically have no need to trust one another’s testimony regarding quantum physics. 
This is not because disagreement among experts in some area is impossible. Rather, 
experts are in possession of area-specific knowledge that enables them to arrive at 
their own considered judgments in that area, so that when disagreement among 
them may arise, individual experts draw upon that area-specific knowledge so as to 
appraise or verify other experts’ testimony. Experts thus have no need to trust other 
experts, for to trust another’s testimony is to invest confidence in its veracity despite 
being unable to wholly verify or certify the truth or justifiability of that testimony in 
the way that experts can. Being peers, experts do not appraise each other’s judg-
ments in their exact area of expertise with the deference that characterizes non- 
experts’ stance toward experts.
There might appear to be instances wherein experts in a given field ought to defer 
to other experts in that same field. For instance, experts may rightfully defer to other 
experts when they have reason to believe that their expertise would be compromised 
by self-interest or a lack of partiality. The adage “a lawyer who represents himself 
has a fool for a client” underscores this possibility. An expert lawyer does not lose 
her expertise when she represents herself, but her capacity to offer expert counsel 
may be weaker precisely because of her personal proximity to the matters calling 
for expert judgment. But note that this example is not best described as an expert 
deferring to another expert. Rather, a would-be expert recognizes that because her 
expertise may not have its usual level of reliability, she is not properly treated as an 
expert in this particular instance. Hence, she is in effect a non-expert deferring to an 
expert.
That experts are those whose testimony in their respective areas of expertise 
ought to be trusted also accounts for why expertise has little traction in those areas 












































or subtraction of single digit numbers) or where there is good reason for  skepticism 
that there is knowledge in any robust or objective sense (experts in unicorn biology, 
say.) (McConnell 1984).
Expertise thus has a set of background social conditions that elicit it and make it 
salient, namely, when
 (a) individuals vary in their levels of knowledge relevant to some endeavor,1
 (b) some individuals acknowledge that they lack the knowledge adequate to make 
choices within that endeavor, and
 (c) individuals in that class seek out experts in that endeavor with the aim of accept-
ing the experts’ testimony for the purpose of making choices within that 
endeavor.
Let us call this set of conditions the expert context.
Expertise thus rests on an asymmetry between knowers. Non-experts look to 
experts in order to judge, choose, or act on the basis of truths they acknowledge an 
inability to discern or justify adequately on their own. “Recognition of expertise,” 
David Archard (2011: 120) observes, “gives the non-expert a good reason to endorse 
the judgment of the expert, a judgment she would not otherwise make or have a 
good reason to make.” (See also Watson, forthcoming) Non-experts’ deference to a 
bona fide expert’s testimony thus improves the epistemic standing of the non- 
experts’ judgments in the expert’s area of knowledge, but not by providing evidence 
intrinsically relevant to the truth of those judgments. In deferring to another’s exper-
tise, a non-expert is implicitly disavowing her ability to fully or adequately evaluate 
the evidence relevant to the judgments about which she defers. The non-expert’s 
evidence for accepting the judgment in question consists in large measure of the fact 
that an expert attests to the truth of the judgment. The expert’s competence in evalu-
ating propositions within her area serves as the non-expert’s primary reason for 
accepting the expert’s testimony. The expert is, we might say, an epistemic surro-
gate for the non-expert.
When the moral expert offers moral testimony, that testimony is correct (when it 
is correct) in a non-accidental way. For she does not issue correct moral testimony 
simply by chance. Her presumed knowledge of the moral domain not only explains 
her testimony, i.e., her moral beliefs do not only account for why she makes the 
moral utterances she does. Her knowledge is also what lends that testimony its cred-
ibility. But what exactly does the moral expert have knowledge of?
A moral expert’s area of expertise is practical and normative. (Iltis and Sheehan 
2016) Moral expertise is practical in the sense that it is constituted by knowledge of 
first-order moral propositions attributing deontic status to choices, traits of moral 
character to individuals, etc. This claim is subject to a careful qualification: A per-
son’s moral expertise may be highly domain-specific (expertise in the morality of 
war or of corporate accounting, say), so that while her advice within that domain 
1 Expertise need not involve only propositional knowledge. A good many crafts, arts, etc., involve 
expertise that consists largely in “knowledge how.” See Dennis Arjo’s contribution to this volume 
(Chap. 2) for how the concept of expertise might include “knowledge how.”










































can be trusted, her moral advice concerning other domains may be no more reliable 
than the average person’s. Moral expertise is normative rather than descriptive 
because it includes knowledge of which putative moral truths are in fact true rather 
than any kind of sociological or psychological knowledge of what moral claims 
individuals or groups accept or why they accept them. This is not to say that moral 
expertise has no descriptive or empirical component. For it will often be true that 
having greater moral knowledge than the average person is explained in part by hav-
ing greater knowledge of non-moral but morally relevant facts. For example, an 
expert in end of life ethics needs to have at least rudimentary factual knowledge of 
which medical interventions tend to sustain or end life. (Conversely, a person may 
be disqualified from being a moral expert by virtue of ignorance of applicable 
empirical facts). The moral expert’s expertise is moral because and to the extent that 
her knowledge of first-moral propositions exceeds and cannot be conceptually 
reduced to her knowledge of some body of non-moral facts. Moral expertise is thus 
compatible with any metatethical stance that affirms the existence of genuinely nor-
mative moral truths.
This characterization of moral expertise leaves some loose ends (for example, 
how to distinguish moral norms from other norms, such as those of etiquette (Foot 
1972)),2 but it points the way toward two conditions individuals must meet in order 
for them to play the controversial social role of moral expert.
Expertise presupposes an epistemic asymmetry between experts and others. But 
how is this asymmetry best understood, i.e., to what degree on in what respect are 
experts more knowledgeable than others? (Driver 2013, Watson forthcoming) 
Answering this question seems to require having some idea of how knowledgeable 
non-experts are about first-order morality. In my estimation, that moral controver-
sies or dilemmas receive so much popular and scholarly attention should not obscure 
that first-order moral knowledge, particularly with respect to relatively straightfor-
ward moral phenomena, is pretty widely distributed among human moral agents. 
Rare are human moral agents who do not know of the moral presumptions against 
deception or causing harm or injury or in favor of keeping promises (their behav-
ioral adherence to these presumptions is another matter). Moral experts must there-
fore have significantly more first-order moral knowledge than this. Let us say that a 
person whose first-order moral knowledge exceeds this threshold satisfies the epis-
temic condition for playing the social role of moral expert.
A second condition for moral experts to play their social role reflects what I ear-
lier called the expert context. A moral expert does not merely have a disproportion-
ate amount of moral knowledge. Other non-expert individuals must, in order for her 
to play the social role of expert, see her moral testimony as more reliable than theirs. 
These non-expert individuals are striving to make moral judgments they understand 
themselves to be insufficiently competent to make absent expert testimony or coun-
sel. As I once expressed it:













































Much in the same way that nothing counts as a chair that cannot be reliably sat upon, so too 
no one can count as an expert in morality who does not satisfy the very expectations of 
those who wish to utilize said expertise for practical purposes. The main expectation is the 
provision of reliable moral advice. (Cholbi 2007:329)
Being a practical affair, morality is ultimately about choosing and doing, and so in 
deeming someone a moral expert, we are not primarily expressing our esteem or 
wonderment, as we might upon learning that an individual can recite π to a large 
number of digits or provide an off-the-cuff accounting of the causes of the Great 
War. We are instead expressing a confidence in their moral counsel. Hence, we 
would be loath to treat someone as a moral expert absent a justifiable confidence in 
the comparative reliability of their moral testimony. A moral expert, then, is some-
one whose high level of moral knowledge justifies her being treated as a reliable 
purveyor of moral advice because other individuals are always pro tanto warranted 
in trusting that individual’s moral testimony. Call this second condition the testimo-
nial condition for moral experts’ discharging their social role.
It is crucial to recognize that moral knowledge and its transmission or acceptance 
by others do not march in lockstep. There is certainly nothing inconsistent about S 
being a moral expert in the sense of having much more first-order moral knowledge 
(S meets the epistemic condition) while S’s moral testimony is nevertheless not 
worthy of others’ trust (S fails to meet the testimonial condition). The converse does 
not hold, however: Any knower whose moral testimony is trusted must, in order for 
that trust to be warranted, actually possess first-order moral knowledge. In the 
absence of such knowledge, the trust of non-experts would be misplaced. For it is 
this knowledge that renders the moral expert “deserving of trust with respect to their 
moral judgments.” (Driver 2006: 625, emphasis added)
4.3  Theoretical Knowledge and the Epistemic Condition
To return to the question at hand: To what extent must individuals have theoretical 
knowledge of morality in order to fulfill the social role played by ostensible moral 
experts?
It might seem obvious that a moral expert must know the correct or best moral 
theory. After all, experts in a given area standardly possess a body of knowledge that 
can at least loosely be called ‘theoretical’. This will be the case with respect to most 
academic knowledge, but it will also be true in cases of more craft-like knowledge. 
A skilled woodworker, for instance, may not know the principles of physics that 
apply to wood, but she will certainly know general principles about how wood is 
affected by various causal processes and which processes to follow in order to real-
ize desired designs or effects. Why deny, then, that theoretical knowledge is essen-
tial to moral expertise?
Dien Ho (2016) believes that the possibility of moral expertise requires neither 
that there be any correct moral theory nor that experts know which moral theory is 
correct. Ho’s position rests on two arguments. I take up the first argument here, the 
second argument in the subsequent section.












































Ho develops his position regarding moral theory’s role in moral expertise in 
response to a common skeptical argument (Ho 2016: 1–3): Moral expertise is 
impossible unless there are true moral theories of which we can have knowledge. 
But because either there are no true moral theories, or we cannot know which moral 
theories are true, then moral expertise is impossible (Frey 1978; Crosthwaite 1995; 
McGrath 2008; Cross 2016). Ho responds to this skeptical argument by appealing 
to observations regarding scientific theories and expertise. There can sometimes be 
“fundamental disagreements” in science that do not “lead to skepticism towards 
scientific expertise,” Ho observes (2016: 371). Basic disputes in physics, for exam-
ple, need not be resolved in order for us retain our confidence in the existence of 
expert knowledge in physics. Quantum mechanics and general relativity are incom-
patible theories, but their incompatibility does not seem to entail that there are no 
expert physicists, much the less that physics expertise is impossible. But if funda-
mental theoretical disagreement in science does not vitiate the prospects for scien-
tific expertise, neither should fundamental theoretical disagreement in ethics vitiate 
the prospects for moral expertise. In the terms laid out in the previous section, Ho 
seems to be denying that experts need have knowledge of moral theory in order to 
satisfy the epistemic condition for individuals to play the social role of moral expert. 
Experts can issue expert moral judgments, and moral inquiry can proceed on famil-
iar terms, even if experts lack knowledge of the true or correct moral theory. 
Therefore, expert moral knowledge need not be theoretical knowledge.
Ho does not develop a robust account of why theoretical disagreement in science 
does not cast doubt on scientific expertise. But here is a conjecture that is at least 
compatible with Ho’s remarks on the matter: Of the various criteria used to evaluate 
scientific theories, predictive power is most central. A scientific theory that issues 
predictions that are not borne out by relevant observations should be rejected. But 
sometimes multiple theories are compatible with relevant observations, in which 
case, all other things being equal, there does not seem any basis for preferring one 
such theory over another. We do not know which of these theories is true or correct, 
and indeed, on some ‘instrumentalist’ conceptions of science, there is not much 
more to a theory’s validity than its predictive success. (Popper 1962) Hence, parti-
sans of any predictively satisfactory theory can rightfully function as experts despite 
their claims to theoretical knowledge being contestable. Hence, Ho argues, perhaps 
we can get along just fine in scientific inquiry, reaching true conclusions, etc., even 
if there exists uncertainty at the level of theory. And so to the extent that experts 
contribute to scientific inquiry, their contributions need not presuppose the truth of 
any theory. Extrapolated to the moral case, moral expertise need not involve theo-
retical knowledge.
I shall assume arguendo that Ho is correct that the lack of theoretical knowledge 
does not undercut scientific expertise. Yet if this is Ho’s intended defense of the 
dispensability of theoretical knowledge to moral expertise, it does not seem to show 
that theoretical knowledge is inessential to moral expertise though.
First, Ho’s position seems to show that when there are no first-order disputes, 
theoretical disagreement does not impugn claims of expertise. If several scientific 
















































defend another theory does not call into question their playing the epistemic roles of 
experts. But the expert context in which moral experts play their distinctive roles are 
contexts in which the moral equivalent of scientific observations — first-order moral 
judgments or ‘intuitions’ — are themselves contested. Moral non-experts look to 
moral experts in part to ascertain what they ought to ‘observe’, not to settle the theo-
retical significance of uncontroversial or already established moral ‘observations.’ 
Thus, the contexts in which theoretical disagreement in the sciences does not 
impugn scientific expertise (where predictions converge across theories) look to be 
a special case, largely inapplicable to the very contexts in which moral experts will 
be called upon for their moral expertise.
We will return to questions about theoretical knowledge and the expert context in 
the next section. But perhaps this criticism is uncharitable to Ho. It could be that the 
dispensability of theoretical knowledge to expertise is most in evidence in contexts 
where there is first-order agreement, but it is dispensable in any context. Yet even 
conceding this, it is not clear that representing the relationship between moral theo-
ries and moral judgments as akin to the predictive relationship between scientific 
theories and scientific observations does justice to the place that moral theories have 
in moral knowledge.
Suppose that some scientific theory T implies some observation O, and that O is 
observed in some experimental setting. O thereby confirms T. On its face, moral 
inquiry may appear to conform to this picture. Suppose that a moral theory M 
implies (in conjunction with relevant empirical facts) a first-order moral judgment 
N. Suppose further that N strikes us as antecedently plausible, i.e., we have a ‘pre- 
theoretical’ intuition in favor of N.  We might say that N thereby ‘verifies’ 
M. Conversely, if N is antecedently implausible, then this counts against or ‘discon-
firms’ M. N is thus evidentially relevant to the truth of M, though of course in nei-
ther case need we assume that N provides conclusive evidence for or against 
M. More specifically, should N ‘disconfirm’ M, we might take this as grounds for 
modifying or qualifying M rather than rejecting it altogether. Following the method 
of reflective equilibrium, we may undertake multiple iterations of this process with 
the aim of identifying the moral theory or principles that reflect the maximally 
coherent relationship between candidate moral principles and our intuitive moral 
judgments. (Rawls 1971). So far then, it may seem that Ho’s analogy between sci-
entific and moral inquiry holds. Moral intuitions ‘predicted’ by a moral theory vin-
dicate that theory in a way structurally similar to the way observations vindicate a 
scientific theory.
In the scientific case, the centrality of predictive success is what lends credibility 
to the theoretical agnosticism to which Ho refers. That T predicts O and O is 
observed seems adequate to the aims of scientific inquiry. To add ‘and furthermore 
T is true’ is either to be redundant or to wade into philosophically contentious terri-
tory. T ought to be accepted (in part) because its predicted observations are borne 
out. The justificatory relationship here thus runs from the observations to theory.
The same cannot, I think, be said, of moral theory and moral judgments. That 
scientific and moral inquiry share an apparently similar hypothetico-deductive 
structure obscures differences between the role that theories play in these domains.















































To see why, consider again a process of verifying a moral theory by appeal to 
intuitions or first-order moral judgments. Suppose that utilitarianism is theory M 
and that M (in conjunction with relevant empirical facts) implies the intuitively 
plausible claim N, that (say) it can sometimes be morally permissible to accede to a 
terminally ill patient’s request to actively hasten her death. (Rachels 1975) M 
implies N, and N’s plausibility suggests that this implication relationship holds. So 
far, so good. It would not, however, be correct to think that the processes of verifica-
tion uncover the same justificatory structure as in the scientific case. Moral theories 
make ‘predictions’ we can test, yes. But in testing them, we take ourselves to be 
testing an assumed explanatory or justificatory relation between moral theories and 
moral judgments, a relation stronger than mere predictive efficacy. If utilitarianism 
implies that it can sometimes be morally permissible to accede to a terminally ill 
patient’s request to actively hasten her death, then the truth of utilitarianism seems 
to account for the truth of this first-order judgment.3 The facts that utilitarianism 
posits as morally relevant (facts about the promotion of welfare, etc.) explain why it 
is the case that it can sometimes be morally permissible to accede to a terminally ill 
patient’s request to actively hasten her death. As Ho notes, the “aim of a discipline 
determines the antecedent need to address deep metaphysical questions.” (2016: 4) 
In the case of morality, our aims include providing justifications of our first-order 
moral judgments in terms of theoretical moral conceptions stronger than the logical 
implication of the former by the latter. An adequate moral theory, unlike (perhaps) 
an adequate scientific theory, does not just get the extensional relationships among 
concepts or properties correct. It explains those relationships as grounded in moral 
facts that are presumptively not local or ‘one-off’. (Timmons 2013) As in the scien-
tific case, moral theories are ‘tested’ against first-order judgments. But the fact that 
we accept a moral theory because it implies plausible first-order moral claims does 
not entail that the justificatory relationship runs from the first-order claims to the 
theory. Rather, the truth of the theory justifies the first-order claims. Moral inquiry 
aims at something more than predictive success, namely, explanatory grounding of 
our first-moral claims. It — and those who claim expertise in it — thus need to 
“address deep metaphysical questions” in ways that science and scientific experts 
may not need to.
A failure to distinguish discovery from justification can obscure this difference. 
When using (say) reflective equilibrium, we are aiming at a mutual attunement of 
our moral theories and our first-order moral judgments. There is a sense, then, in 
which (for example) that utilitarianism implies that it is sometimes morally permis-
sible to accede to a terminally ill patient’s request to actively hasten her death gives 
us reasons to accept utilitarianism. The biconditional
Utilitarianism is true if and only if it is sometimes morally permissible to accede to a termi-
nally ill patient’s request to actively hasten her death
cannot be true unless both utilitarianism is true and that it is sometimes morally 
permissible to accede to a terminally ill patient’s request to actively hasten her 













































death. But the fact that we might ‘discover’ that the latter is intuitively plausible and 
thereby confirm the former does not entail that the truth of the latter explains the 
truth of the former. The explanatory relationship is in fact the reverse.
Our reasons for accepting first-order moral judgments thus cannot be detached 
from the moral theories that imply them as readily as observations can be detached 
from the scientific theories that imply them. Theoretical considerations play a role 
in moral deliberation and moral reasoning that they need not play, and often do not 
play, in scientific deliberation and scientific reasoning. (Hooker 1998) With respect 
to moral expertise, moral experts will need to rely upon theories (or theory-like 
considerations) in a more direct way than will scientific experts. For moral theories 
are reason-giving in a way that scientific theories are not: Scientific theories can be 
acceptable even if they only indicate extensional relationships among their con-
cepts. Moral theories, on the other hand, derive their plausibility from the relation-
ships among their concepts being both genuinely explanatory and justificatory. A 
moral theory gives us largely theory-based reasons to believe a first-order moral 
judgment, whereas a scientific theory gives us reasons to anticipate observations 
that themselves bear on whether we have reason to accept the theory. To revert to 
our earlier example, utilitarianism does not merely imply that acceding to a patient’s 
request to actively hasten her death is morally permissible. It purports to give us a 
reason that accounts for its moral permissibility.
Ho’s analogy between moral theory and inquiry on the one hand and scientific 
theory and inquiry on the other hand thus proves suspect. For unlike in the scientific 
case, the evidential or justificatory relationship between moral theories and first- 
order moral judgments cannot be modeled on or reduced to how theories imply or 
‘predict’ first-order moral judgments. To the extent that moral experts can contrib-
ute to moral inquiry, they would seem to need to possess knowledge of the correct 
moral theory (or theory-like considerations) in order for their moral testimony to be 
supported by moral reasons. And in the absence of providing reasons in favor of 
their own moral convictions, it is hard to see how moral experts could contribute to 
progress in moral inquiry at all.
4.4  Theoretical Knowledge and the Testimonial Condition
Ho offers a second argument for the independence of moral expertise from moral 
theory, one that suggests that experts can satisfy my testimonial condition without 
reference to theoretical moral knowledge. Ho argues that because theoretical knowl-
edge is often unnecessary in order for moral disagreement to be rationally resolved, 
experts need not have theoretical knowledge in order to provide expert counsel 
regarding moral questions. To think otherwise is to falsely assume that “without a 
normative framework, one cannot solve any moral problems.” But because that 
assumption is false, individuals can rightfully claim to be experts, and play the typi-
cal role of moral experts, even absent knowledge of the true or correct moral theory. 
(Ho 2016: 381).











































Here Ho seems to cast doubt on the place of theoretical moral knowledge in 
moral expertise by indicating that such knowledge is not essential in order for 
experts to satisfy the testimonial condition. Experts’ moral testimony can and ought 
be trusted despite experts not invoking moral theory in support of that testimony. 
Hence, even if (contrary to the considerations adduced in the previous section) theo-
retical moral knowledge is necessary in order for moral experts to function as 
experts, such knowledge is not essential to non-experts’ investing their trust in the 
moral testimony of experts.
Ho is certainly correct that moral disputes are often resolved without the invoca-
tion of robust theoretical claims. In many ordinary deliberative contexts, individuals 
may seek to persuade one another, or seek consensus, regarding some moral ques-
tion without giving so much as a thought to how various answers to that question 
might be theoretically grounded.
“When we try to determine what we ought to do, we do not take some broad ethi-
cal theory, plug in the particulars of the situation, and see what recommendation 
falls out,” Ho observes. “Moral problems, unlike calculus, are usually not solved by 
filling in the values for the variables” a moral theory designates as morally relevant. 
(2016: 374)
But Ho’s inference that because shared moral deliberation often proceeds in 
largely atheoretical terms moral experts’ testimony can be atheoretical seems 
unwarranted. Indeed, Ho again overlooks that the expert context is one where theo-
retical knowledge is likely to be sought out. Echoing Judith Thomson (Thomson 
1990), Ho observes that disputes about moral issues are often resolved via “dis-
course within a narrow context in which we assume some shared moral judgments, 
and we do not challenge the broad foundation of morality.” (2016: 375) But the 
perceived need for consulting moral experts arises primarily or most acutely in con-
texts in which the participants in a moral discourse have concluded that their own 
deliberative capacities are inadequate to the moral question at hand — that with 
respect to these moral phenomena at least, they are not sufficiently expert. They 
may find themselves dumbfounded by novel moral phenomena, beset by competing 
moral intuitions about those phenomena, unable to render those intuitions about 
these phenomena consistent with judgments about other seemingly similar phenom-
ena, etc. Any resolution of these moral questions likely to satisfy these non-experts 
will need to engage with morality’s theoretical foundations. In terms familiar from 
Aristotle, these non-experts’ struggles with ‘the that’ of morality reflect struggles 
with ‘the why’ of morality. Their inability to answer the moral questions that chal-
lenge them often reflects a lack of theoretical understanding, of which theoretical 
principles are relevant to those questions and what those principles imply. If an 
expert is to assist them, that expert must therefore invoke the theoretical knowledge 
needed to provide that understanding. Put differently, in many contexts of moral 
inquiry, the contributors to that inquiry operate as competent peers, seeing them-
selves and others as roughly equally capable to address the moral questions at issue. 
But as noted earlier, the relationship between moral experts and those who might 
accept their moral testimony is asymmetric, for the contexts in which moral inquir-
















































 competencies to be inadequate, i.e., they are implicitly casting doubt on their shared 
moral judgments and assumptions. And the guidance they seek is theoretical in 
nature.
We can get a better handle on the place of moral theory in expert moral testimony 
by imagining a moral expert who espouses an ‘anti-theoretical’ stance. Take, for 
instance, Jonathan Dancy’s particularist moral theory (Dancy 2004), which proudly 
denies that moral knowledge can be systematized or codified. According to his the-
ory, principles (which we would ordinarily expect to play a crucial role in system-
atizing or codifying our moral knowledge) have an extremely limited role in moral 
thought or choice. There are not, according to Dancy, defensible moral principles 
nor is moral deliberation characterized by the invocation of principles to address 
specific cases. Indeed, Dancy goes so far as to embrace a radically contextualist or 
holistic picture of practical reasons, denying even that there are true principles con-
cerning the relevance of a given consideration (e.g., that an act would cause harm) 
to the moral justification of action.
Dancy’s particularism represents the skeptical end of a spectrum regarding the 
prospect of moral knowledge being systematized or codified.4 But note that this 
skeptical stance seems to have implications concerning moral expertise: If this form 
of particularism is true, then individuals whose moral knowledge satisfies the epis-
temic condition may nevertheless fail the testimonial condition and thereby be dis-
qualified to play the social role of moral experts. Other moral experts, possessed of 
the same body of moral knowledge as a particularist moral expert, would of course 
find whatever moral counsel such an expert provides highly reliable (though, of 
course, being experts themselves, they would presumably have lesser need for or 
interest in such counsel). But those who sought out the particularist’s moral counsel 
would be understandably uncertain about what level of confidence to have in such 
counsel. Consistent with the theoretical commitments of particularism, a would-be 
particularist moral expert could not straightforwardly appeal to principles to explain 
why her counsel is warranted in any specific case. For the particularist’s expertise 
consists less in knowledge of such principles than in knowledge of which consider-
ations are relevant to the case at hand and how they are relevant. Nor could she 
readily employ standard methods of moral argumentation in such explanations. For 
example, using generalizations and counterexamples in an effort to persuade her 
audience of the reliability of her moral claims would be greatly complicated by the 
fact (at least it is a fact according to particularism) that any consideration invoked in 
a generalization supporting a moral claim could play a different justificatory role in 
another moral context.
My point here is not to argue against particularism of any kind. Rather, I merely 
wish to stress that there are profound tensions within Dancy-style particularism 
between the epistemic and testimonial dimensions of expertise, that is, given how 
particularism represents the moral knowledge possession of which is necessary for 
a would-be expert to satisfy the epistemic condition, any individual who satisfies 
4 Other more moderate particularisms (for instance, Little 2001) may admit the possibility that 
moral experts can meet the testimonial condition.












































this condition is not likely to satisfy the testimonial condition. For particularist 
moral knowledge is opaque in a manner that makes moral expertise very difficult to 
judge, particularly for those who are not experts and are seeking the counsel of 
moral experts. Particularism is therefore likely to face an uphill battle in trying to 
address Scott LaBarge calls the “credentials problem,” i.e., the problem of how non- 
experts can be rationally warranted in accepting the moral testimony of putative 
experts. (LaBarge 2005)
Again, I do not take these observations to refute particularism. If there are moral 
experts, then particularism is cast in doubt, and conversely, if particularism is true, 
then perhaps there are no moral experts. I take no stance on which of these options 
is correct. All the same, the case of particularism underscores a critical point regard-
ing how moral theories relate to moral expertise: There are, or at least can be, gaps 
between the warrant a moral expert has for her moral beliefs, including her theoreti-
cal beliefs, and the warrant that others may have for trusting those experts’ moral 
testimony. Particularism, I just argued, appears to have an unusually wide such gap.
The case of particularism illustrates that a moral expert would be seriously ham-
pered in playing the role dictated by the expert context if either she did not (or seem-
ingly could not, in the case of the particularist moral expert) invoke theoretical 
claims. In this regard, the considerations show that theoretical knowledge is needed 
in order for experts to satisfy the testimonial condition parallel those that show that 
theoretical knowledge is needed for experts to satisfy the epistemic condition. The 
practice of shared moral inquiry and deliberation is oriented around reason giving. 
As soon as moral inquirers acknowledge a need for expert aid, they are compelled 
to assess a putative moral expert’s testimony based on the reasons that support such 
testimony. This exercise mirrors first-personal moral reasoning, but occurs when 
moral agents acknowledge the shortcomings of their own first-personal moral rea-
soning. And in looking to experts, their trust in the experts’ testimony should hinge 
in part on the experts’ invoking theoretical claims (or making theoretical argumen-
tative moves) in support of their testimony.
It may be thought that my defense of the centrality of theoretical knowledge to 
moral expertise ends up insisting that non-experts be experts. For I have argued that 
in order for non-experts to invest their trust in the moral testimony of putative 
experts, those experts must give evidence of theoretical knowledge. But it might 
then be inferred that non-experts are evaluating the experts’ testimony as if they (the 
non-experts) were experts themselves, evaluating the experts’ theoretical commit-
ments as if they possessed the very expert moral knowledge they seek from the 
moral expert.
Invariably, non-experts will have to make judgments about the credibility of 
expert testimony, a challenge complicated by their own lack of expertise. But they 
need not be experts themselves in order to reach intelligible judgments about moral 
experts’ moral testimony. For one, they may appraise that testimony by reference to 
what might be thought of as the experts’ theoretical virtues. An expert who gives 
(seemingly) inconsistent testimony, who cannot provide a basis for morally differ-
entiating similar phenomena, or who cannot answer rudimentary objections is not 
















































truth in moral theory inasmuch as partisans of rival theories may possess them to the 
same degree. All the same, non-experts have reasons to hold such an expert’s moral 
testimony in suspicion. My invocation of these theoretical virtues is not meant to 
offer a complete account of the considerations that non-experts ought to take into 
account in deciding whether a putative moral expert’s moral testimony deserves to 
be trusted. I merely mean to highlight that non-experts have rational bases on which 
to appraise the credibility of such testimony that do not presuppose that the non- 
experts have expert knowledge. More importantly, an expert’s inability to give any 
theoretical accounting of her testimony regarding first-order moral questions would, 
I propose, be a ‘red flag’ alerting non-experts that the expert’s claim to reliable to 
first-order moral knowledge should be second guessed.
In sum then, by neglecting the peculiarities of the expert context, Ho wrongly 
extrapolates from the fact that typical discursive contexts do not invoke moral the-
ory that the atypical contexts in which experts come on the scene need not invoke 
moral theory. We should agree with Ho that it is foolish to think that a theoretical 
framework is necessary to “solve any moral problems.” But we should be skeptical 
that experts can satisfactorily solve moral problems absent reference to any theoreti-
cal framework. Ho thus convincingly demonstrates that theory is not needed when 
experts are not needed. But there is good reason to think that theory is needed just 
when experts (apparently) are.
4.5  Conclusion
I have provided no reason to think there are experts in moral theory, nor any guid-
ance regarding the true or correct moral theory knowledge of which would be neces-
sary for an individual to be a moral expert. I have attempted to defend the centrality 
of theoretical knowledge to moral expertise against those who deny that moral 
experts must have theoretical knowledge or that experts’ moral testimony can be 
rightfully trusted by others if that testimony is atheoretical. In order for individuals 
to have moral expertise, their moral testimony must be ultimately rooted in theoreti-
cal knowledge.. Theory has a reason-giving function in moral discourse that it lacks 
in other discourses, including scientific discourse. Moral experts must therefore be 
theoretical experts.
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